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SIMULMATICS FIELD TEAM

VIET NAM

FIRST PROGRESS REPORT

DRAFT:

This is a draft for criticism
and comment. Suggestions and
corrections will be appreciated.

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I. Introduction

The Simulmatics Field Team has been in Viet Nam for less than two months. The present report therefore reflects only first impressions, not tested research results. The "conclusions" are ideas whose validity our next five months of research must examine.

II. The Chieu Hoi Program

We have by now visited a number of Chieu Hoi Centers, interviewed quite a few administrators in the program, examined a sample of surrender leaflets and interviewed in depth a number of Quy Chanh. We feel that we have by now identified a number of central problems.

One problem of the Chieu Hoi program is that it is valuable from so many points of view that it suffers from conflict of purposes.

One purpose of the Chieu Hoi program ^{should be} ~~is~~ the production of intelligence assets. That purpose deserves absolute primacy for the only effective way to identify and find the Communist Party cadres and their facilities is thru former members who know them. Every Party level Quy Chanh is a prize of inestimable worth and should be handled that way.

A second purpose of the program is attrition of VC strength. The VC can ill afford the drain of manpower that a good Chieu Hoi program can induce. This is attested to by the vehemence of the VC response. Furthermore every Quy Chanh by compromising a VC unit disrupts it. The mere prospect of defections forces the VC to devote time and energy to surveillance and to tighten their security controls. Compared to military means alone the Chieu Hoi program is very cost-effective. It costs us far less per man lost to the VC.

A third purpose of the program is moral. It demonstrates the character of American and GVN purpose in Viet Nam which is to build a unified and humane nation, not to destroy its people.

These purposes are not irreconcilable even through the first purpose puts an emphasis on the quality of Quy Chanh won over, the second on their quantity, and the third on the treatment of Quy Chanh rather than on their military exploitation. A good program, however, can serve all purposes simultaneously. An effectively run program that treats Quy Chanh well will win more of them over and will win more higher cadres by treating them with the respect they deserve.

Our first interviews indicate that Quy Chanh get their main background information on the Chieu Hoi program from leaflets, but confirm it before taking action by grapevine information from a relative or friend.

If that is so, two things follow:

- (A) Our leaflet effort is of utmost importance but partly off base.

(B) The biggest single thing that can be done to increase the effectiveness of the Chieu Hoi program is to improve the handling of the Quy Chanh in their period in the Centers and after, so that the grapevine will report favorably.

We shall discuss first what can be done to improve the Chieu Hoi program and then the leaflet effort.

The Positive Side of the Picture:

Despite all its weaknesses, the overall evaluation of the Chieu Hoi Program is positive. It is doing an essential job with devotion and against considerable odds. Some 15,000 VC per year are being rehabilitated. The oft heard allegation that the Centers are R & R camps for the VC is nonsense and needs to be firmly rebutted. Preliminary data suggest that a minority of 20 or 25 percent of the Quy Chanh may end up in locations where they are once again under some VC pressure and have to comply to some degree to VC threats, but the vast majority of Quy Chanh genuinely turn about in their loyalties. Various programs such as health care, literary training

and vocational education may be lacking in many or most Centers, but conversely each activity program we recommend is present in some Centers and is part of the formative plans of the Chieu Hoi program. It is ^{a generally} well conceived program that needs to be implemented to a ^{much} higher degree than is currently the case.

Problems:

We list here some of the more obvious defects of the Chieu Hoi program as it functions today.

- (1) Until he is in the hands of the civil authorities the Quy Chanh can not be sure that he will be treated humanely.
- (2) By the time he gets into the hands of anyone who knows how to use his information, several days may have passed and the information may have lost its value.
- (3) The Quy Chanh often does not receive promptly the money he is supposed to get for weapons brought in, or for pocket money, or upon departure from the Center, or it may not get paid at all.
- (4) ~~More~~ Often ~~than not~~ the Quy Chanh is ill when he arrives, but usually he receives no medical treatment.
- (5) Though he has been told that his family can join him at the Center, often that is not allowed.
- (6) The Centers are sometimes overcrowded.
- (7) Time hangs heavy at the Center. There is often nothing to do. Activity programs are minimal.
- (8) The political education course is dull, far over the heads of the Quy Chanh, delivered largely in lecture fashion. All Quy Chanh receive the same course regardless of their political sophistication.

- (9) In many Centers the Quy Chanh spend six hours a day, all in one room, sitting in straight chairs or wooden benches, ostensibly being lectured at. In fact in some Centers for long parts of the day they just sit and wait because the cadre is busy or not ready to lecture. They are kept sitting in rows in the classroom whether there is class or not. For the student it hardly matters whether someone is up in front droning away or not. He is probably just day-dreaming. Typically he cannot tell you what the lecture was about even if there was one.
- (10) Most Centers offer little or no vocational training.
- (11) Very few Centers offer any literary education.
- (12) Many Centers have no radio.
- (13) Most Centers do not use the grounds to grow food. The Quy Chanh are mostly farmers. It is hard to eat adequately on 24 piasters a day, but the land around the Center is often left as uncultivated mud flats.
- (14) The staffs of the Centers are often of inadequate quality. The chiefs are often low grade civil servants for whom this assignment is a kind of exile. The lower cadres often have no qualifications at all.
- (15) Few ex-Quy Chanh are employed in the Centers' staffs.
- (16) The administration of the Centers is often paternalistic. It is seldom harsh, but the cadre are often afraid of losing control if they do not treat their charges as children.

- (17) Little use is made of indigenous methods of construction.

The Centers often need additional buildings. Thatch or other indigenous construction is cool, cheap, rapid, homelike to the Quy Chanh, and materials are available. Plenty of manpower sits around the Centers. But in most places it is felt inappropriate to build a government building (which the Center is) except out of cement and brick.

- (18) Provincial^{and GVN} officials, particularly Province Chiefs sometimes have little interest in the Chieu Hoi program. Some of them still regard it as an R&R program for the VC.

- (19) When the Quy Chanh leave the Centers they usually do not yet have their ID card. They have only their Center document identifying them as ex-Communists. Without an ID card (which is often 3 to 6 months coming) it is hard to get a job.

- (20) Many employers, including many American employers, will not hire Quy Chanh.

- (21) There has been little co-operation by the Ministry of Labor in locating jobs for Quy Chanh.

- (22) There are few facilities for settling Quy Chanh as farmers. The Chieu Hoi hamlets are a great step forward, but usually provide space only for a housesite and garden plot. The Quy Chanh in such hamlets still need to find jobs.

- (23) There is a much debated problem about separate hamlets of Quy Chanh. From the outsiders point of view it would seem better to mix refugees and Quy Chanh, rather than having a clump of Quy Chanh permanently together, but the impression to date seems to be that the refugees will not accept this.

- (24) There are insufficient outlets for energetic and experienced Viet Cong cadres in other government cadre programs. Ordinarily only the Chieu Hoi ministry hires Quy Chanh. Therefore, the only cadre program into which they can ordinarily go is the Armed Propaganda Teams (in which they do very well). Very few of them are appointed to the RDC.
- (25) Closer co-operation between the RDC program and the Chieu Hoi program would help both. The grievance census and other RDC activities should put more emphasis on producing Quy Chanh and the Quy Chanh are an excellent recruiting pool for the RDC.
- (26) There is no program for VIP or unit defections. The present Chieu Hoi program is after the largest number of Viet Cong and that is obtained by winning over reluctant VC draftees (who are not really communists) by stressing the hardship of their life in the VC and their separation from their family. A program to win knowledgeable, long-time Party members would produce few individuals but important ones. It would require the use of more sophisticated political appeals. Such a program does not now exist.

Recommendations:

- (1) There needs to be a special program for winning over VIP Quy Chanh and whole VC units. Actually the focus need not be solely on very high level PRP cadres who at this stage of the war are largely unconvertable. The focus for now

should be on long time Party members and middle level headquarters personnel. Such men are able to identify large numbers of Party cadres for intelligence purposes.

It is not clear what the division of labor between the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi and the police and intelligence community should be in such a program. On the one hand the Chieu Hoi program has not had the competence up to now to launch such a sophisticated program. On the other hand any arbitrary division of responsibility would be harmful. The cadre hierarchy of the VC is a seamless web. If there are two channels there will always be people of high intelligence interest coming into the Chieu Hoi channel and vice versa. Furthermore the VIPs also need resettling and rehabilitation. The situation seems to require a co-operative program between the relevant ministries.

- (2) Bounties should be established for Army of the Republic of Viet Nam for producing prisoners of war and (military, not civilian) Quy Chanh.

These should be both individual and unit rewards. The rewards should be substantial starting at 1000 piasters for the successful captor and 1000 piasters for his platoon for producing one private. Rewards should go up sharply for higher level or unit surrenders. The reward should depend upon delivering the man promptly and unbeaten to intelligence personnel.

This bounty system would probably work better than the oft suggested system of payments to higher level VC and to units for coming over. It also avoids the political resistance in Viet Nam to rewarding ex-Communists for what they have done. It is also far more likely to teach ARVN to take prisoners than is exhortation alone.

Our research team has been repeatedly asked to figure out ways in which VC could safely surrender so that our leaflets could tell them what to do. There does not seem to be any such way as long as ARVN's present attitude towards prisoners persists. The key thing is to get ARVN to want to take prisoners. Conventions about techniques will then follow and be learned by both sides.

Both the individual and the unit reward should be paid in every instance though sometimes the individual reward should be divided. The unit reward obtains poor group backing for the individual who would like to take a prisoner. It also reduces bickering about the division of the individual reward since everyone is getting something.

- (3) A prisoner should be allowed to rally any time up to the completion of his interrogation and be treated as a Quy Chanh. The military unit that takes in a VC should not have to decide whether he is a rallier or a prisoner. Their instructions should be simple - to get as many live VC as they can and to turn them over for interrogation quickly and unharmed. The VC should be given every chance to provide intelligence.

No moralistic considerations should prevent his being used, though he makes the difficult decision to cooperate only after capture. If he gives a hostage of loyalty to the GVN by responding frankly to interrogation and signing his name to

anti-VC propaganda he should be accepted as a Quy Chanh regardless of his intent at the moment of capture.

- (4) Nationally issued, numbered, double-signed, duplicate receipts should be used for all payments for weapons, for the 200 P of pocket money, and for the 500 P upon leaving the Center. This will not stop cheating, but will make it harder. The Chieu Hoi administrator will not be able to collect these moneys without submitting receipts signed by the Quy Chanh. The latter may sometimes sign without receiving the money, but is less likely to if the receipt on the face of it tells him not to do so and tells him what is due him. Today, many Quy Chanh do not know if they are being cheated.

- (5) Medical service should be provided by regular periodic visits of medical personnel to the Center. This should be provided not only by Vietnamese doctors, but also as civic action by American military units and by American and third country medical missions around the country.

The reality of medical treatment in the Centers must be established first. Then that fact can be used as one of the most effective psywar themes. Disease is rampant in the conditions under which VC forces live. ^{Many} ~~Most~~ Quy Chanh now come in partly because they are sick. To the man who is sick in body and depressed in spirit, no appeal could be stronger than the promise of medical treatment. To instill credibility, the leaflets might well promise that the Quy Chanh will receive "treatment by Vietnamese and Western" medical men.

(6) Materials for a short literacy course for Chieu Hoi Centers should be developed. The average stay of a Quy Chanh in a Center is about two months. Therefore a full literacy program is impossible. However, the bulk of those Quy Chanh who need literacy training have had some school already and can benefit by a short period of instruction. No vocational or other training course has as much value to offer as many Quy Chanh as a literacy course. More Quy Chanh could use it than need any other one kind of training. Any other one kind of vocational training is relevant to perhaps 10% at most of the men in a Center. This one may be relevant to half. The development of materials for literacy training, while important for the Chieu Hoi program, has high priority for a number of other educational and development programs. It should therefore be undertaken by USAID as a priority project.

(7) The Chieu Hoi administration should change its instructions to the Centers to specify that no more than two hours a day be spent by the entire group of Quy Chanh in class at once. The present common practice of sitting in class for 5-6 hours a day is partly a response to the normative schedule outlined at headquarters and posted on the wall of many Centers.

The Provincial Chieu Hoi Chiefs should be told to restrict classroom teaching to just morning or afternoon and to use the time thus released in two ways.

a) The Quy Chanh should be put to work more. They are now sometimes used on self-help improvement projects around the Centers, in growing food, on corvee labor, even on contract money-earning projects.* Such activities are much better for the Quy Chanh than sitting around the Center killing time and should be encouraged.

b) Small group discussions should replace lectures. Centers with more than a dozen or so Quy Chanh, the Quy Chanh are divided up into squads with a Quy Chanh leader. It is far better to have these squads meet to talk over their problems, discuss their experiences, rehash the days lecture, etc., than to listen to a teacher, no matter how much wiser he may be. All we know about the psychology of attitude change tells us that conversion is not induced by mere listening to talk, but requires active rehearsing of the new views and small groups reinforcement of them.

(8) USAID should put a radio in every Center.

(9) One Chieu Hoi Center or perhaps two should be developed into a demonstration Center. Three or four American group workers, teachers, guidance counsellors and social workers should be provided as advisors to develop a program of small group discussions, vocational training, group activities, and personal guidance.

Having identified 25 weaknesses in the Chieu Hoi program, it would be easy to go through the list and recommend that each one be corrected. We could recommend more vocational training, more agricultural activity, more recreational

* The Moc Hoa Center manufactures uniforms for the special forces.

activity, more self-help projects, etc. Realism, however, compels one to recognize that the problem is not listing things that should be done - they are mostly well recognized. The real problem is to get them done. Exhortation to the Center directors and Provincial Chieu Hoi Chiefs will achieve little unless focussed on no more than two or three simple items at a time. Otherwise, the system will be overwhelmed. ^{therefore} We recommend only three items for high priority administrative action by the local Chieu Hoi Chiefs, namely medical care (Recommendation 5), literacy training, ~~literacy training~~ (Recommendation 6), and replacing lecture hours with active uses of time (Recommendation 7). How are all the other improvements to be achieved? In particular how can the rather ill-qualified cadres of the Centers be taught how to institute small group discussion, interesting and effective political education, and an atmosphere of active spontaneous participation rather than paternalism. The best way to teach such subtle but crucial pedagogical techniques is by experience and example.

We therefore urge the prompt development of a model center to which cadres from other Centers can be sent to observe and be trained. This Center would serve as a place in which to create and experiment with ideological courses, literary courses, vocational courses, agriculture paid work, and self-help projects. It would demonstrate what can be achieved in recruitment and training of Quy Chanh for Armed Propaganda Teams and other cadre activities. It would set a standard by which other Centers would be measured.

facts of life of target audiences. Therefore nothing

There are good reasons for making the National Center in Saigon the model Center, but there are equally good reasons against. The National Center is the obvious place to which to bring people for demonstrations and training. It already is at a higher standard than most Centers. It would be ironical if another Center were given precedence over the National Center to which the most important Quy Chanh are sent. On the other hand the National Center has so many assets not available to Provincial Centers that the directors of the latter are not likely to recognize it as an appropriate model for them. Also, so many political pressures are at work on the National Center that American group workers, and guidance counsellors, are likely to find substantially greater resistance than elsewhere to having their advice followed.

We therefore recommend that if only one demonstration Center is developed it be a Provincial Center, but that consideration be given to working on two demonstration Centers simultaneously - the National Center and one Provincial Center.

- (10) An experiment should be made in settling Quy Chanh and refugees in a mixed village to see if the general expectation that the refugees will reject the Quy Chanh is justified or is sheer imagination.
- (11) U.S. channels should be used to secure jobs for Quy Chanh, especially jobs that use their special knowledge.
 - a) RMK and other American government contractors should be informed that the American government looks with favor on the employment of Quy Chanh.
 - b) A similar memorandum should go to American advisors. Note should be made of the fact that Province Chiefs select

(3) The themes adopted, good as well as poor, have been justified so far mostly by assumption and ^{personal} experience rather than data. No American, however ingenious, can guess how a Vietnamese and specifically a VC will interpret every detail of a leaflet.

For example, a recent small copy-test of standard leaflets (by showing them to Quy Chanh) showed among other things errors in the portrayal of the dress of the VC, VC sitting on the ground when they would actually be on their haunches, weapons implausibly lying on the ground, and a family scene that suggests a wealthy household instead of a peasant one. Leaflets without text were found to be misinterpreted half the time. Without pretesting such errors are inevitable.*

Besides copy-testing, experiments might be conducted on the effectiveness of different strategies. With 40 provinces it would be possible to try out alternative approaches in 3 or 4 at a time. What would happen with a trebling of the leaflet effort, or with no leaflets, or with a less conspicuous safe-conduct pass, or with some new motivational theme.

Leaflet evaluation and coordination is a continuing in-house responsibility of JUSPAO. Additional research staff in JUSPAO is needed if that job is to be done.

* Perhaps the worst single error now occasionally made is diabolization of the VC. This error is discussed in part (i) below.

Contract researchers could be called upon to help get the effort started by a study of possible leaflet evaluation methods and by substantive studies of possible alternative themes. The day to day job of control can only be done by strengthening JUSPAO research.

Delays in Response

In some places it can take up to two weeks to get a plane to drop leaflets to exploit information about a situation revealed by a new Quy Chanh or prisoner. (In other places this problem has been licked.)

There is often a delay in getting the new information source to psyops personnel, if, indeed he is not pulled away from them entirely for exploitation by higher level intelligence personnel. Once the field psyops personnel have the information they can produce leaflets fast. Often, however, there is a delay in obtaining a plane to deliver the leaflets. Access to planes is partly a function of the level of the person asking. Control of planes is generally at the divisional level. High requests get prompt response. Working level persons are often frustrated.

Inappropriate Blends of Propaganda, Information and Appeals to Action

Some of the leaflets produced are still propagandistic in tone, describing the VC as cruel and evil. Typically a leaflet's main content is to stress the hardships and suffering of the VC. It may end in an appeal to act by defection. It has 200 or so words of text but little new information. Such a leaflet is wrong

for most situations.

- (1) The VC are not regarded as cruel and evil ~~EXER~~ ^{former VC} by ^{men who} ^{now} are thoroughly against them. Even sincere Quy Chanh see the VC cadres as generally idealists devoted to the good of the common people and selective in applying terror to their enemies. They are not seen as being cruel to the Vietnamese peasant population but only to government officials, bad men, the wealthy, or Americans. If the Quy Chanh rejects the VC now it is for many reasons including the inability of the VC to deliver on its promises or the excessive demands it makes on its followers. But they still concede idealism and service to the individuals in the VC. It is a mistake for leaflets to diabolize the VC. For it sounds silly and hysterical to the receiver.

Examples of this error are leaflets showing the VC burning a village or beating peasants. This is counter-productive in leaflets address to VC members. Whatever their discontents with the VC, they do not believe the VC does such things to ordinary peasants, only to their enemies and exploiters. The people we are addressing interpret such leaflets as saying that they themselves are cruel and wicked for they are VC too. A factual appeal telling them how to achieve their personal goals would avoid this reaction.

Basic psychological principles suggest that most short agitational leaflets should recommend some action. The VC do not need to be told that their food is short and that they are far from their families unless there is some action for

them to take about it. They know their own condition better than we. What they need are useable suggestions. Secrete a surrender pass is one such suggestion. Become a Quy Chanh is another. However, many receivers of leaflets are not in a position to take such action at once.

More ingenuity is needed in thinking about feasible actions that serve the personal interests of audience members while hurting the VC as an organization. Should we, for example, have more leaflets which advise villagers how to avoid VC taxes or how they can safely pass on intelligence to the GVN and what intelligence to pass?

- (2) On the other hand, the most common effect of the leaflets is, as we have seen, not action, but background information for later action. The short agitational leaflet of the kind we generally drop does not convey much information. It has no room to tell many human interest stories of the lives of successful Quy Chanh, to describe in living detail the difference between life in GVN areas and VC as are, to tell the story of government welfare programs.

In other wars an effective psywar device was the air-dropping of a newspaper. We applaud the initiation of such a paper here. In Vietnam, radio is not yet a fully effective channel to the villages though the transistor revolution is just starting. Literacy is relatively high for a developing country but newspaper circulation is not.

A specially written, low keyed, newsy, non-agitational newspaper written for the villagers may help change the information world of many of them. It might also affect Party cadres, for although their organizational training is highly sophisticated their level of knowledge of the world is not. (We interviewed the former head of the Saigon bomb squad whose answer to the question who was Karl Marx was that he thought he was one of the leaders of the Russian Revolution.) We can afford to devote some of our leaflet effort to information the population under VC control.

III. Social Research in Vietnam

A second task in the Simulmatics contract with ARPA is consultation to JUSPAO on its social science research.

We have worked closely with Mr. Sullivan, the Research Officer in the Planning Office of JUSPAO and have reviewed JUSPAO's research.

One conclusion has come as a very pleasant surprise: polling and survey research in Vietnam turn out to be much more feasible than we originally thought or than most people think. Respondents are remarkably candid. As in any country, there are areas of reserve, but people have little hesitation about voicing their criticisms of government or their own desires. Furthermore, JUSPAO has built an excellent data collection organization through the Center for Vietnamese Studies. Whatever criticisms may be made of what happens to the results, the field data collection done by JUSPAO has been of high quality.

We have addressed ourselves to considering what additional social research should be launched in support of the war effort. The following is a list of high priority studies.

Study of the Effects of Bombing

RAND has examined this issue ably and intensely. Their methods, however, do not permit a definitive answer to the question of the attitude consequences of bombing. RAND's contract task is to interview ex-VC. Their topic is Vietcong motivation and morale. The attitude consequences on the general public of present bombing policy cannot be fully ascertained by asking ex-VC what they think.

We recommend that a study be conducted with a more careful statistical design. Villagers attitudes should be ascertained on a variety of measures such as attitudes towards Americans and toward the GVN. This should be done in villages matched so as to be similar except for whether there has been (1) no bombing near them, (2) bombing nearby but not there (a) recently and (b) in the more distant past, (3) bombing there (a) recently and (b) in the more distant past. With good controls the differences should reflect the effects of bombing as such.

Set of Studies on Cadre Development

The need for competent motivated village level leadership is recognized by both U.S. and GVN authorities. The existing programs to recruit grass roots personnel, train them for leadership, and motivate them are at best a beginning. Motivational

training is done poorly on our side in comparison with what is done by the VC. In our interviews we ask Quy Chanh to compare the training they got in the VC with the training they got in the Chieu Hoi Centers. The comparison is lamentable. PF motivational training and RDC motivational training is somewhat better than in the Chieu Hoi Centers but still not good. The problem stems partly from a French conception of education, partly from an authoritarian tradition of human relations, partly from inexperience.

A series of studies might help put cadre training on a better basis.

(1) A study of education in Vietnam.

There are many justifications for such a study, but one purpose is to help Vietnamese educators to understand the lacks in prevailing pedagogical methods by way of student participation and spontaneity. Only when the training of Vietnamese teachers changes will cadre training change fully for it is among teachers that many of the trainers of cadres are recruited.

(2) A study of the RDC.

It is time for an evaluation of this effort. What kind of people are being appointed? What is their motivation? How effective are the teaching methods used at Vung Tao? What possibilities are there for introduction of gaming, video-tape, and small group participation as teaching devices?

(3) A study of the PF.

An ARPA study of the RF/PF is about to get under way. Among other things, it should look at the training methods covering the same questions as just mentioned for the RDC.

(4) A study of VC motivational training.

How do they do it? This can be answered by examination of the appropriate portions of the RAND interviews.

Development of a Hamlet Data Bank

There are two essential kinds of data that should be readily available for every hamlet in Vietnam:

- (1) Biographical files on the political leadership, VC and nationalist.
- (2) Economic information on crops, land distribution, where the crops go, education, water supply, etc.

The source of both files is in large part interrogation. Both files need to be dynamic, allowing for constant updating and change. The users of the two files are different, but much of the data is common and needs to be shared.

The development of PICs represents substantial progress on the side of biographical data on the VC, though national data sharing will present major problems. There is need for equally thorough, accessible, and current economic data. The grievance census provides a framework for collecting much, though not all of the data. Information in these censuses should be used for national purposes, though in ways that do not threaten the province chief.

A study should address itself to:

The categories of information that would be useful.

Who wants to know what?

The available sources. What arises out of current government records? What arises out of grievance censuses? What could be obtained by systematizing interrogation?

The record keeping system. How can the data be kept accessible and current?

Effects of TV in Vietnam

Now, while TV is just being introduced, is the time to evaluate the worth of this experiment. It is still possible to study communities before TV has arrived, while it is coming in, and after it is there. Such a study could establish what effect, if any, this introduction of TV has in reducing political dissidence and turbulence. It could evaluate the worth of continued or expanded efforts by the U.S. to diffuse TV in Vietnam. Once TV has come in, it is much harder to evaluate its effect. The moment of change is the moment to observe.

Studies of Politically Viable Groups in Vietnam

Winning the war in Vietnam depends on (1) a military effort (which is going rather well), (2) a civic and welfare program (into which much effort is going), (3) an intelligence and police program (which is only now beginning to be made rational), and (4) the

development of political organizations that can compete with the VC for peoples allegiance. The last of these processes has hardly begun and is the greatest gap in the current program. In a democratic society there will be no one alternative to the VC but rather a plurality of groups each with sufficient appeal to rally a portion of the ordinary people. A study should be made of each grouping with sufficient vitality and appeal so that it might become one of the significant political forces in Vietnam. We list ~~them in~~ some ~~rough order of priority for~~ ^{examples:} ~~study~~

- (1) The labor movement
- (2) The Hoa Hao
- (3) The Chinese Community
- (4) The Buddhists

Case Studies of VC Villages

There are a number of VC controlled villages from which half a dozen or more ralliers have come. From some of those, grievance census information might also be available. With half a dozen informants, it becomes possible to get a comprehensive picture of life in a VC village. How is control maintained? How much loyalty is there and how is it divided? How is the Party organized? Who are the individuals who run things? How has the social system changed under VC control? What vulnerabilities does the VC have? How could the population be turned around? A couple of village studies exist, but with the varieties of Vietnamese life several such inquiries are needed.

Study of Land Reform

This is a thorny subject to which the answers are not obvious. We need further study of how villagers really feel about it. The methods of the previous study are applicable here.

VC Commo-Liaison System

One of the crucial parts of the VC organization is the commo-liaison system. The VC keep elaborate records and maintain a tight reporting and control system over all actions. Every decision taken at any level must be reviewed and confirmed by the Party committee at the next higher level. The communication system is vital to the VC and is perhaps vulnerable. A study of the commo-liaison system and possible vulnerabilities in it could be done largely out of the existing RAND interviews and captured documents.

Study of the Rice Trade

We need to know a lot more than we do about what rice goes where, who controls it, etc.

Third Country Nationals

It is often assumed that Filipinos or other TCN's can do a better job (or at least a more cost-effective job) because as Asians they will understand the Vietnamese. That is perhaps sometimes so, perhaps sometimes not. The question needs a careful look. It is not clear that language difficulties are any less for them than for us. Does their lower living standard make them more adaptable?

What are Vietnamese attitudes toward them? Large numbers are coming in with modest skills looking for jobs. Is the adjustment of these different from that of the skilled professionals? Are ghettos and minority problems developing?

Trend Studies of the Peoples Attitudes and Morale

It would be irresponsible not to learn as much as can be learned about Vietnamese attitudes towards the War, the VC, the GVN, and the United States. We can not afford to be taken by surprise. As stated above, experience shows that survey research can produce useful data on these matters. Needless to say sampling in VC areas is impossible and in safe areas answers are not to be taken at face value. That does not make survey research useless. It does make it essential to subject the results to very sophisticated analysis. For example, one can learn a lot from (1) intergroup comparisons and (2) time series comparisons.

- (1) If 10% of the population say the Americans should go home, that does not mean 10% think so. Depending on sensitivities to social pressure the true number feeling that way may be more or may be less. But if one finds that twice as many answer that way among women in cities with large U.S. military establishments (or half as many) one has learned something.

Up to now JUSPAO research has reported only rather raw figures. JUSPAO has not had the research staff to do detailed analysis. We recommend that the research staff be expanded and at the same time that a contract be written with an

experienced research group for cross-tabulation analysis in the U.S.A. of the survey data already accumulated.

- (2) Just as comparisons between groups reveal something, so do comparisons over time. If the percentage answering Americans go home rises from 10% to 15% that is serious. The barometer survey idea was sound. It should be revived. Of course survey results are sometimes sensitive. So is any kind of honest intelligence. The results on sensitive items will, of course, be classified. On balance, however, it will serve U.S. and GVN purposes far better for the press and public to realize that Vietnam is the kind of country where questions can be asked and answered, and where public opinion is complex, than to permit the persistence of presently widespread notions that the GVN is a military regime with no public support.

A second reason for regular polling over time is that a stable organization can produce results fast. A turn around time of two weeks from request to answer is possible for an organization that is steadily in the field. To crank up a study starting from scratch takes much longer.

We shall not here repeat, but note for completeness the research suggestions made in parts I. and II. of this report, i.e., studies of leaflet appeals, the development of literacy materials, and experimentation with a model Chieu Hoi Center.

We shall also not spell out, but mention for reference, several important studies already under way at the ARPA R&D Field Unit, i.e., a study of refugees, the RAND studies of VC motivation and morale, Hickey's study of the Montagnards, Elliot's study of Dinh Tuong, Simulmatics study of the Chieu Hoi program, and a study of the role of women in Vietnam.

The 11 to 20 (depending on how one counts) studies that we here recommend could all be launched within the next nine months. Professional manpower has previously been a major bottleneck to providing the government with the research support it has needed. There are plenty of good social scientists in the U.S.A. Few of them, however, have any area competence on Vietnam. Many of them were swept up in ideological opposition to the war, and few were ready to leave dependents behind for months on end. While these three problems still remain, there is reason to feel that the corner has been turned. The efforts of RAND, Simulmatics and other ARPA contractors have built a significant kernel of good social scientists with a commitment to Vietnam. The pattern of work developed by the Simulmatics research team with senior scientists staying 2-3 months and junior scientists longer has succeeded. It could be used to involve several times as many

scholars in Vietnamese research efforts. It would take some time to build up to a fully appropriate level of effort, but by the end of nine months this entire program could be under way.

APPENDIX TO REPORT

Activities of the Research Team as of August 20, 1966

The Following American professionals have been working in
Viet Nam:

Dr. Ithiel de Sola Pool, Chairman, Political Science
Department, M.I.T.

Dr. James Whittaker, Professor of Psychology, North
Dakota State University

Dr. Walter Slote, Psychoanalyst, New York City

Dr. Lee Wiggins, Sociologist, Columbia University

Mrs. Belle Wiggins, Sociologist

Mr. Daniel Grady, The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy

Mr. Lawrence Grinter, The University of North Carolina

Mr. William Knight, Harvard University

Lt. Col. J. David Yates (U.S.A. Ret.) The Simulmatics
Corporation

We have employed three Vietnamese translators and interviewers
and are working with and training Vietnamese counterparts.

Dr. Slote has completed six weeks of depth interviewing (about
40 hours each) with four disaffected Vietnamese.

The team has now visited 15 Chieu Hoi Centers and two Chieu Hoi
villages in various parts of Vietnam.

We have completed six prototype depth interviews of the kind that we will be using with more Quy Chanh and edited the questionnaire.

We have drawn a sample of 131 Quy Chanh in two provinces to ascertain how many could be traced, located 25 of them and interviewed those. We shall continue this study for JUSPAO in other provinces.

We have conducted about 30 unstructured interviews with various officials concerned with the Chieu Hoi program. In this process we have established contact with all the top American and Vietnamese officials involved.

Dr. Whittaker has studied the leaflet output relevant to the Chieu Hoi program.

Dr. Lee Wiggins is analyzing data collected in various JUSPAO studies, including the current election study and the Tet campaign study.

We provided some analysis and supervisory staff for JUSPAO projects in the field when Dr. Sullivan became ill.

Dr. Belle Wiggins has interviewed some 30 women leaders and representative women and established contact with about a dozen womens organizations as a basis for designing a study of the role of women in Vietnam.

Dr. Pool has briefed the Vung Tau training course for U.S. Field Representatives, the USAID research group, Ambassador Porter, Mr. Zerthian and others on the teams preliminary findings.